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COMPARATIVEPERFORMANCE OF
RATING SYSTEMS
THE agency ratings, legal lists, and market ratings we have ex-
amined constitute three separate systems for rating corporate
bonds. The purpose of the present chapter is to compare the
efficiency of the three systems in meeting different investment
objectives.
The principal problem that arises in comparing the efficiency
of different rating systems is that investors have different objectives
and therefore attach different weights to the various attributes of
securities outstanding in the market. This means that it is not
possible to satisfy all investor requirements fully from any single
group of securities or to define any single "best" list that will be
entirely satisfactory to all parties. Large investors have one set
of requirements, small investors another; and a program appropri-
ate for one group would be inappropriate for others. Thus there
is an essential conceptual difficulty involved in comparing the
performance of lists of high-grade securities defined by the differ-
ent rating systems.
For purposes of the present chapter, we shall take our lead
from the regulatory authorities, who are faced with the day-to-day
problems of selecting securities for the legal lists and of establish-
ing various valuation procedures and rules under which financial
intermediaries operate. Although the emphasis changes under
different circumstances, the regulatory authorities generally seek
to achieve the following objectives:
The list of eligible securities should be as inclusive as pos-
sible (should have maximum coverage by volume).
The volume of securities on the list should be as stable as
possible (should be subject to a minimum amount of
fluctuation over time);
The list should be as safe as possible (should have mini-
mum default risk).
The returns should be as attractive as pOssible (realized
yields should be a maximum).COMPARISONS 343
Clearly, all of these objectives cannot be satisfied fully in any
single list of securities, and hard compromises must be effected in
practice. For example, the most inclusive list would comprise all
outstanding issues, but such a list would have higher default rates
than one selected on the basis of some efficient indicator of bond
quality. Again, securities on a stable list would have the desirable
feature that, once purchased, they would never have to be sold;
but unless such a list were very restrictive as to volume, it would
be insensitive to impending defaults. Similarly, a restrictive but
relatively unstable list could presumably be designed to avoid
heavy defaults, but at the expense of lower realized rates of re-
turn. An.d so on through the categories of investment objectives.
Fortunately we are not confronted with the delicate problems of
balance and weighting involved in the actual construction of legal
lists and other investment standards. Our problem here will be a
much simpler one of comparing the extent to which selected lists
of securities satisfy the criteria listed above, when each criterion
is considered separately.
Because of their official status, the lists selected for special study
are issues rated in the first four agency-rating grades (composite
ratings i—iv), the legal lists, and equivalent lists of securities rated
as high grade by the market. The use of "equivalent" lists
throughout most of the analysis enables us to eliminate such dis-
turbances as are caused solely by differences in inclusiveness. The
lists have already been compared in earlier chapters with respect
to their inclusiveness. The essential question at this point is
whether one rating system is superior or inferior to another when
both are defined so as to include equally comprehensive lists of
securities. Thus a list comprised of all issues in the first four
agency-rating grades is one and one-half to five times as inclusive
as the legal lists (cf. Tables 27 and 42), and the life-span realized
yields are higher (cf. Tables 39 and 51); but the default rates are
also generally higher (cf. Tables 33 and 47). By comparing lists
equally inclusive as to volume, and confined to issues that both
systems judged, we can determine the extent to which such dif-
ferences are due to the superiority of one rating system or an-
other, or simply to differences in the inclusiveness of the lists.
In the first section of the chapter, the legal lists of three states,
and issues in the first four agency-rating grades, are each compared
with equally inclusive lists selected on the basis of the market
rating. Equivalent groups of bonds selected by the different sys-344 PERFORMANCE OF RATING SYSTEMS
tems are compared with respect to stability, safety, and yield. The
chapter closes with a comparison of each of the three legal lists
with equally inclusive lists selected on the basis of the composite
agency rating.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Generally speaking, a list that included all issues in the first four
agency-rating grades at the beginning of a period was more stable
volume-wise than an equally inclusive list selected on the basis of
the market rating. Generally speaking also, the legal lists were
more stable than their market-selected equivalents. For most of
the periods analyzed, the proportion of the total volume of issues
initially rated high grade by the market that was still so rated at
the end of the period was below the corresponding proportion for
issues on the legal lists or rated high grade by the agencies. Since
the market rating is extremely sensitive to changing bond market
conditions, it was necessary to revise the market-rating standard
or yield test frequently when it was used to define a list roughly
equivalent to those meeting other tests (cf. Chapter 5).
The extreme sensitivity of the market rating to changing bond
market conditions, however, has the advantage of predicting de-
faults on outstanding issues over short periods. In particular, the
quadrennial default rates for issues selected on the basis of the
market rating at the beginning of a period were predominantly
below those for legal bonds or for issues rated i—iv. Thus the price
paid for stability of volume by investors using agency ratings and
legal lists is the reduced safety or relative insensitivity of the lists
to impending defaults.
Less systematic differences were observed in the default rates
covering the life spans of issues from offering to extinguishment.
Default rates were higher on legals than on the equivalent groups
of market-selected high grades, largely because of the poor per-
formance of rail issues favored by the legal lists. On the other
hand, default experience was better for issues in the first four
agency-rating grades at offering than for the equivalent group
selected by the market, largely because of the instability of the
market rating over time.
Yield records of equally inclusive lists of securities during eight-
year and longer chronological periods of investment show only
minor differences, with the realized returns obtained on theCOMPARISONS 345
market-selected lists usually lower than on the legal lists and on
issues in the first four agency-rating grades.
Larger and more systematic differences are observed in the
yields calculated from offering to extinguishment. When the
equivalent lists are selected from all regular offerings since 1920,
the average promised and realized yields for high grades chosen
by the market are generally below the corresponding averages for
legal bonds and for issues in the first four agency-rating grades,
and the loss rates are markedly higher (or the capital gain rates
are lower). Again the principal explanation for the differences is
the instability of the market rating. Yield spreads at offering were
lower in periods of market optimism than in periods of market
pessimism, and subsequent default experience was usually poor for
bonds offered in periods of optimism. Although the agencies and
the legal lists were not insensitive to market psychology, they were
less sensitive than the market itself. For example, a relatively large
proportion of the total volume of issues in the first four agency-
rating grades at offering consisted of bonds offered in the early
twenties or late thirties, and the default rates and yield experience
on such offerings were unusually favorable (cf. Chapter 2). On
the other hand, a disproportionately large volume of offerings in
the equivalent group selected by the market was offered in the
late twenties and not extinguished by 1932, and such offerings
were subject to the full impact of the heavy default risks of the
Great Depression. Hence their life-span realized yields were on the
average lower than those of the corresponding agency-rating list
and their loss rates were higher (or their capital gain rates lower).
Comparisons as to default and yield experience between legal
bonds and equally inclusive lists constructed from agency ratings
show only minor differences that are generally not statistically
significant. So far as the record goes, it suggests that the agency rat-
ings were perhaps slightly more sensitive to impending defaults
than the legal lists. Promised yields and loss rates on legal bonds
were usually higher than on the agency-rating equivalents, so that
realized yields were about the same, but neither of these two rat-
ing systems was markedly superior to the other, either in these or
in other respects.346 PERFORMANCE OF RATING SYSTEMS
MARKET RATINGS VERSUS AGENCY
RATINGS AND LEGAL LISTS
The following section compares the stability, safety, and yield ex-
perience of issues on the legal lists, and of issues rated high grade
by the investment rating agencies, with equally inclusive lists se-
lected by means of the market rating. Excluded are securities for
which market ratings could not be obtained (i.e. issues not rated
by the market) and those not rated by the investment agencies.
Since the published legallists are presumed to be virtually
complete (cf. Chapter 4, on the nature of the lists), all securities
were treated as "rated" with respect to legal status, and none was
excluded on that count. The comparisons. may therefore be in-
terpreted as based on all issues rated both by the statutory legal
tests and by the market, or, in passages pertaining to agency rat-
ings, by the investment agencies and the market.
Comparative Stability
Data on the comparative stability of lists selected by agency and
by market ratings are presented in Table 68, and by legal tests
and market ratings in Table 69. The tables are similar to Tables
31, 45, and 58 of preceding chapters, except that they cover
equally inclusive groups of securities. For example, in construct-
ing Table 68, only issues rated both by the market and by at least
one agency at the beginning of a given quadrennial period were
included in the comparison for that period. For this jointly rated
group the par amount rated i—iv by the agencies and the propor-
tion of the total included in that category were first determined
(see the first and second columns of the table). All of the jointly
rated outstandings were then arrayed in ascending order by mar-
ket rating at the beginning of the period, and the volume cor-
responding to the percent rated i—iv was noted. The boundary of
this group is shown in the third column. As the final step, the
percent of the par-amount total of issues originally rated i—iv
that remained in grades i—iv at the end of the period was cal-
culated, as was the percent still having a yield spread equal to
or lower than the corresponding market rating in the third col-
umn. At the beginning of 1916, for example, $1 1.1 billion of the
jointly rated outstanding issues fell in the first four rating grades,
and comprised 89 percent of the par amount of all jointly rated
outstanding issues. In the same year, 89 percent of all jointly ratedCOMPARISONS 847
TABLE 68—Percent of High-grade Outstandings Still Rated
High at End of Four-year Periods of Investment: Agency
Selections Compared with Equal Volumes of Market
Selections, 1912—43
ISSUES WITR AGENCY
RATING I-IVATBEGIN- PERCENT IN INDICATED
PERIOD
NING OF PERIOD AND ALSO



















1912—15$ 7,001.7 93.2% 1.3% 89.2% 81.3%
1916—19 11,065.6 88.9 2.0 93.1 76.5
1920—23 11,815.9 89,8 3.7 93.0 94.3
1924—27 14,209.3 87.6 2.9 98.1 95.5
1928—31 17,712.4 90.0 2.1 85.6 54.5
1932—35 16,950.1 76.9 5.4 79.2 89.6
1936—39 9,276.8 66.9 2.3 73.4 57.2
1940—43 9,298.0 64.7 3.5 98.1 97.9
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research:
par amount data for all large (straight) corporate issues that were rated both
by the market and by at least one investment agency, and for 10 percent of
such small issues adjusted quadrennially to universe totals, with issues extin-
guished during each period excluded.
aAmongissues rated by both systems, percent indicated in preceding
column had yield spread of this amount or less at beginning of period.
'-'Thatis, the percentage of the par-amount total of issues in indicated
class at the beginning of the period (exclusive, in each case, of issues not
rated by both systems) that remained in that class at the end of the period.
outstandings had a market rating of 2.0 percent or less, so that
issues rated x—iv and those with market ratings of 2.0 percent or
less constituted equally inclusive lists of top-grade securities. At
the end of the period 1916—19 (specifically, the first quarter of
1920) 93 percent of the par amount of issues originally rated
i—iv was still so rated, while only 77 percent of the equivalent list
of securities selected by means of the market rating still had a
market rating of 2.0 percent or less. Thus a list selected on the
basis of market ratings was less stable than one selected according
to agency ratings over the period 1916—19. The statistics on legal348 PERFORMANCE OF RATING SYSTEMS
TABLE69—Percent of High-grade Outstandings StillRated
High at End of Four-year Periods of Investment: Legal
Lists of Maine, Massachusetts, and New York Compared
with Equal Volumes Rated High by the Market, 1912—43
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research:
par-amount data for all large (straight) corporate issues that were rated by the
market, and for 10 percent of such small issues adjusted quadrennially to
universe totals, with issues extinguished during each period excluded.
aIndicatedpercent in preceding column had yield spread of this amount
or less at beginning of period.
b That is, the percentage of the par-amount total of issues in indicated
class at the beginning of the period that remained in that class at the end of
the period.
ISSUES LEGAL AT BEGIN- PERCENT IN INDICATED
NING OF PERIOD AND CLASS AT BEGINNING




































































































































status in Table 69 were constructed similarly; in this case, since
all issues are either legal or not legal in a given state and year,
all were considered as having been rated under that system, and
only those not rated by the market were excluded in obtaining
a sample of issues rated by both.
Comparison of the percentage changes for issues rated i—Iv,
issues legal in the several states, and their respective market-rating
equivalents reveals roughly similar movements over most of the
four-year periods. The market-selected lists, however, were less
stable than their corresponding agency and legal groups in three-
quarters of the comparisons. The inherent property of the market
rating is such that when the market-rating boundary rises from
the beginning to the end of a period, stability is relatively low;
and vice versa, when it falls, stability is relatively high. Thus for
the four periods of declining bond market values covered by
Table 68 (see also Tables 8 and 23) the groups selected by market
rating were much less stable than those chosen by agency rating.
For the other four periods (those over which bond market values
moved upward), the percent remaining in the same market-rating
class was high (close to 90 percent or above), and in two of these
periods, 1920—23, and 1932—35, the market high grades were more
stable than the top four agency grades.
The picture is similar in Table 69 except for the period
1932—35, when the market generally improved but the Massa-
chusetts and New York legal lists proved more stable than market-
selected high grades. This atypical behavior was caused by the
temporary suspension of the earnings test for rail bonds (i.e. the
deliberate retention of low-grade issues on the legal lists); when
the moratoria were lifted, issues were dropped from the legal
lists and the latter promptly became less stable than their market-
rating equivalents (New York and Massachusetts, 1940—43). In
Maine, where a moratorium on rail earnings was not enacted, the
group chosen by market rating was more stable than the legal
list in 1932—35; but in both cases the percentage remaining on
the list was low.
Additional evidence on the stability of the different lists may
be obtained by comparing the percentages of total rated out-
standings that were upgraded or downgraded in different years.
Averages of the annual percentages of net upgrading and net
downgrading (under the two variants explained earlier) are pre-
sented in Table 70 for the period 1915—43, when most of the rating350 PERFORMANCE OF RATING SYSTEMS
TABLE 70—Average Annual Percent of Upgrading and Down-
grading over the Period 1915—43 for Issues Rated by the






















































The percentages are based on rated outstandings at the beginning of each
year. Since all issues are either legal or not legal in a given state and year,
rated outstandings do not differ from total outstandings for the legal lists.
Based on total outstartdings (rather than rated outstan.dings) for 1913—43,
average upgrading and downgrading under Variant LI was 2.8 percent for
agency ratings and 5.0 percent for market ratings. The Maine list covers
only the years 1924—43; over that period average upgrading and downgrading
under Variant II was 2.7 percent for agency ratings, 2.5 percent for Massa-
chusetts legals, 3.3 percent for New York legals, and 6.0 percent for market
ratings.
For method of calculating upgrading and downgrading under Variants
I and II, and sources of data, see Charts 9, 14, and 19, and related text.
systems were in existence. Since the percentages are based on
issues rated under the respective systems, and since the Maine
list was not published until late in 1923, the data are not strictly
comparable either as to volume or number of years covered, but
rough adjustments for those discrepancies show little change (see
the note to Table 70). In general, this evidence supports what
has been said earlier about the relative stability of the differentCOMPARISONS 351
lists. On the average, larger percentages of the volume of out-
standing issues were upgraded or downgraded by the market
than by the investment agencies or the regulatory authorities.
We conclude that the market was usually less stable than the
agency ratings and legal lists. When the bond market rose and
capital gains occurred, the differences in the stability of the vari-
ous equivalent groups were usually not pronounced. But when
the bond market deteriorated and capital losses, instead of gains,
occurred, the agency ratings and legal lists were much more stable
than the market.
These findings imply that it would be necessary to revise a
yield test frequently to include roughly the same proportion of
issues covered by other tests. The fluctuations in the boundary
setting off market-selected high from low grades, apparent in the
tables, reveal the underlying weakness of a yield or market-rating
test, as does the actual experience of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners in applying such a test in recent years
(cf. Chapter 5). A further practical difficulty involved in using
the market rating as an eligibility test under present conditions
is that of obtaining satisfactory market quotations for privately
placed issues, a problem also encountered to some extent in apply-
ing an agency-rating test. Largely for these reasons, the Insurance
Commissioners dropped the yield test and now apply an agency-
rating test supplemented by tests based on balance sheet and
earnings ratios.
Comparative Safety
Data relating to the comparative safety of lists of high grades
selected by agency rating or legal status on the one hand and
equally inclusive lists obtained from market ratings on the other
are presented in Tables 71 and 72. The data were processed in
essentially the same fashion as for the preceding tables on the
stability of the lists, except that the market-rating equivalents were
determined for each of the three major industry groups rather
than for the total of all industries combined, in order to increase
the number of independent comparisons that could be made.
Of the twenty-four possible independent comparisons within
the industry groupings of Table 71, default rates based on market
ratings were lower than those based on agency ratings in thirteen
cases, were higher in only five cases, and were equal in six cases.






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































independent pairs of default rates; and the probability that one
particular set of default rates in these eighteen pairs will exceed
the other set in thirteen or more comparisons is just at the thresh-
old of statistical significance.1 Weconcludethat market ratings
are quite probably more sensitive to impending defaults over
short periods than agency ratings, in the sense that the quad-
rennial default rates of the best group of issues selected under
the one system were lower than those selected under the other.
It must be admitted, however, that statistical significance under
the test applied here does not necessarily imply practical signifi-
cance, since a small difference in the default rates in favor of
one system of ratings or another is treated as though it were as
important as a large difference. In fact, in seven of the eighteen
comparisons, the differences were smaller than 0.5 percent, or so
small as to be of questionable practical significance. Moreover,
examination of the default rates for the most recent periods sug-
gests that the market may have become less sensitive to impending
defaults with the passage of time. Thus of the five cases in which
the default rates for the agency selections were lower than those
for the market-rating equivalents, three occurred in the last two
periods covered by the table. Except in those periods, the market
appears to have been comparatively more successful in the rail
and utility fields than in the industrial.
1 That is, a "sign test" was applied by subtracting the default rates for the
market-rating equivalents from the default rates for the agency-rating lists
and by noting the number of times that plus and minus signs occurred. The
probability of obtaining thirteen or more plus signs out of eighteen, on the
hypothesis that plus and minus signs are equally likely, is 0.048, a probability
low enough to raise a doubt as to the reasonableness of the hypothesis that the
two events are equally likely.
Some readers may be puzzled by our decision to ignore the ties when apply-
ing the sign test, since the usual practice in empirical economic research has
been to treat half as pluses and half as minuses. W. J. Dixon and A. M. Mood's
°The Statistical Sign Test," Journal of the American Statistical Association,
1946, Vol. 41, p. 558, recommends that procedure; but in An Introduction to
Statistical Analysis (New York, 1950), p. 248, W. J. Dixon and F. J. Massey pro-
pose that ties be omitted. In neither source is an explanation given.
The effect of omitting the ties is to increase the power of the test at a given
level of significance. The principle involved is that, given two tests having
the same probability of rejecting the nul hypothesis when it is true (Type
i error), that one should be selected which has the lower probability of ac-
cepting the nul hypothesis when it is false (Type ix error). A rigorous proof
that the sign test with ties omitted is at least as powerful a test at a given
level of significance as when the ties are equally distributed is given by
J. Hemelrijk. in "A Theorem on the Sign Test when Ties are Present," Pro-
ceedings Koninklijke Ned erlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen, Amsterdam,







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































As has been indicated earlier, the legal lists include a much
smaller volume of securities than a list comprised of issues in
the first four agency-rating grades. As a result, quadrennial de-
fault rates for legal bonds and their market-rating equivalents
are usually well below those for the agency ratings and their
market-rating equivalents. In fact, too few defaults occurred on
legal bonds to permit a reliable statistical comparison. Neverthe-
less, in eight of the nine instances in which defaults occurred on
legal bonds or their market-rating equivalents within the major
industry groupings, the comparisons ran in favor of the market
ratings and against the legal lists (Table 72). The comparisons are
not easily tested statistically in this case since the paired rates are
not independent of one another (i.e. certain of the rates reflect
the experience of issues legal in more than one state). But the
differences, when they occur, are usually so substantial as to leave
little doubt that the market was more sensitive to impending
defaults over short periods than the legal lists. The relative in-
sensitivity to default of the legal lists and of a list selected on
the basis of agency ratings is the price paid for their greater sta-
bility. Since relatively small amounts over a given short period
were deleted from the legal lists or dropped below grade Iv, the
default record is poorer for them than for equally inclusive lists
selected on the basis of market ratings.
The sensitivity of market ratings on outstanding issues to short-
run default risk probably arises largely from the flexibility of
market quotations. The market is continuously revising its rat-
ings upward or downward on the basis of the most recent infor-
mation; but the legal lists and the agency ratings are revised
intermittently, and are not so prompt in reflecting the latest in-
formation. On the other hand, the very flexibility of market rat-
ings constitutes a serious weakness when they are applied as an
invariant standard for the selection of securities over a long pe-
riod. The market rating provides a sensitive yardstick for rank-
ing issues in order of default risk at any given moment; but the
yardstick is elastic, expanding and contracting with investor con-
fidence. It follows that the quality of issues meeting any fixed yield
standard may vary inversely, and the volume may vary directly,
with the degree of optimism of the market.
As we saw in Chapter 5, life-span default rates on total offerings
during 1900—1943 were related inversely to quality as judged by
the market, thus indicating that the market rating was sufficiently356 PERFORMANCE OF RATING SYSTEMS
stable over the full period studied to serve as a useful predictor
of the risk of default. The question remains, however, whether
the market, the agency ratings, or the legal lists were superior in
this respect.
TABLE 73—Proportions of Offerings 1908—43 That Went into
Default before 1944: Agency Selections and Legal Lists
Compared with Equal Volumes Rated by the Market
OFFERINGS RATEDBY BOTH AGENCV AND MARKET
High and Those with Those with
Low-grades Agency Market Rating
Combined Rating I—IV Equivalent
All industries 16.3% 12.3% 13.6%
Railroads 29.7 26.0 28.7
Public utilities 9.5 5.6 6.9
Industrials 17.2 13.3 13.1
OFFERINGS RATEDBYBOTHLEGAL LIST AND MARKET
High and Those with
Low-grades Thoseon Market Rating
Combined Legal List Equivalent
Maine
All industries 12.0% 6.6% 5.5%
Railroads 29.9 29.7 23.7
Public utilities 8.2 0. 1 0.8
Industrials 6.3 0.0 0.0
Massachusetts
Allindustries 16.8 8.8 8.8
Railroads 29.5 24.7 25.2
Public utilities 8.6 0.1 1 .0
Industrials
New York
All industries 14.4 8.9 5.8
Railroads 26.7 22.9 24.1
Publicutilities 9. 1 0. 1 1 .0
Industrials 0.0 0.0 0.0
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research:
par-amount data for all large (straight) corporate issues and for 10 percent
of small issues adjusted annually to universe totals, exclusive of offerings
not rated by both of a given pair of rating systems. The default rates for the
market-rating equivalents for all industries were computed without regard
to industry composition. When recomputed by combining the totals of the
component industry groups, the market-rating equivalents, in the several
comparisons from top to bottom, are; 13.6 percent (agency ratings); 6.2
percent (Maine legals); 8.8 percent (Massachusetts legals); 10.5 percent
(New York legals).COMPARISONS 357
Some evidence on the question is brought together in Table 73,
and more detailed data of the same general type are presented in
Charts 20 through 23. The table presents life-span default rates
for equally inclusive groups of high grades chosen from offerings
during 1908-43, comparing the judgments of the agencies and
the market on the one hand, and of the legal lists and the market
on the other. Since the market-rating groups were determined by
arraying all offerings during the full period studied in order of
the yield spread at offering, the table shows the effects of applying a
fixed yield-spread standard to offerings over a long span of years.
Only offerings rated by both of two compared rating systems are
included. The charts are similar except that they compare in de-
tail the default rates by rating grade.
It appears from Table 73 that the agencies were more effective
than the market in predicting life-span default risk at offering.
Although the differences in the default rates are fairly small, they
are clearly in favor of the agencies in the all-industry figures, and
in railroads and public utilities as well. The same point is brought
out in Chart 20. Since each panel of the chart covers only jointly
rated offerings, lower default rates to the left of any given point
(and higher default rates to the right of it) indicate a superior
rating system. (A perfect system would separate all defaults from
nondefaults; the graph would then be a step function, hugging
the base line for the high grades and jumping to 100 percent for
the low grades.) Although the agencies and the market were far
from perfect in predicting default rates. at offering, it is clear from
the chart that the default rates for the agency selections were
generally lower for the high grades and higher for the low grades
than were the market ratings, showing that the agencies had the
superior system. The chart shows also that the market was par-
ticularly inept in the case of rail offerings. As a matter of fact,
the life-span default rates for the market-selected high grades of
that industry differed but little from the over-all default rate for
rails (see also Table 73), indicating that the market rating at offer-
ing was almost (but not quite) worthless as an indicator of the
prospective quality of rail offerings. The principal explanation
is that the market was excessively optimistic about rail offerings
in the twenties (as subsequent high default rates were to prove)
and was excessively depressed in the thirties (as subsequent low
default rates were to show). The use of a fixed market-rating test
at offering thus resulted in a perverse selection for rails. In the358 PERFORMANCEOF RATING SYSTEMS
CHART20—Agency and Market Ratings Compared with Respect
to Life-span Default Rates
Default rate (percent)
40
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research for years
when bond issues in the given industry groups were rated by one or more agencies:
par-amount data for all large (straight) corporate issues rated both by the market
and by at least one investment agency, and for 10 percent of such small issues ad-
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other two industry groups, the market and the agencies moved
more nearly together, and the later default experience was less
sharply contrasted; for utilities, the agencies had the better rec-
ord, and for industrials th.e market had somewhat the better.
Since life-span default rates were lower for high grades selected
by agency ratings than by market ratings, and since the reverse
was true for default rates on outstandings over quadrennial pe-
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CHART21—Legal Status in Maine and Market Rating Compared
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From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research for years
when bond issues in the given industry groups were included on the Maine legal
list: par-amount data for afl large (siraight) corporate issues rated by the market
as well as by the Maine regulatory authorities, and for 10 percent of such small issues
adlusted annually to universe totals.
Note: In industrials the default rate was zero for legals and the market rating class
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agencyratings at offering was due simply to the instability of
the market rating. To put the matter differently: Which was the
better predictor of default risk at offering, after allowing for time
shifts in the market rating? In attempting to answer this question,
we conducted the experiment of selecting equivalent lists of offer-
ings annually, thus in effect eliminating the influence of year-to-
year shifts in the market rating. The results were fairly incon-
clusive; so far as they go, they were in favor of the market rating.
Of the twenty-four years during 1920—43 for which comparisons
were made, the default rates for offerings rated i—iv by the agencies
were higher than for the equivalent market rating list ten times,
were lower six times, and the two were tied eight times. The average
of the twenty-four annual default rates was 10.3 percent for the362 PERFORMANCEOF RATING SYSTEMS
CHART22—Legal Status in Massachusetts and Market Rating










20— — • ••• •••••••,•••••••••••••,• ....... .......... .e.tp...........
I I
S s





Percent of total rated offerings
• Legal status in Massachusetts: legal (left), not legal (right)
Market ratings: classes (left to right) under 1/2 to 1%,
Ito 2%, 2% and over
From special tabulations oc the National Bureau of Economk Research for years
when bond issues in the given industry groups were included on the Massachusetts
legallist: par-amount data for all large (straight) corporate issues rated by the
market as well as by the Massachusetts regulatory authorities, and for 10 percent
of such small issues adjusted annually to universe totals.
agencyratings and 9.9 percent for the market ratings; and in the
five-year periods 1920—24, 1930—34, and 1935—39 the average default
rate for the market-rating equivalent was also lower, though not
in 1925—29, when the market was excessively bouyant, nor in
1940—43, when neither group showed any defaults. There is thus
some evidence that the market was a more efficient predictor than
the agencies when applied to offerings or outstandings at a given
moment of time. On the other hand, the market yardstick shifted, so
that it was less efficient than the agency grade applied as an in-
variant standard over a long period.
So far as the market and the legal lists are concerned, the evi-
dence is generally, in favor of the market for all issues combined,
but in favor of the legal lists within major industry groups. Thus
in Table 73, high grades selected by the market show lower de-
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legals,and the same rate as Massachusetts legals, but show higher
or tied rates for every industry subgroup except Maine rails. The
explanation is the heavy weight given the rails by the legal lists
in the all-industry figures and the heavy default incidence of the
rail group. As Charts 21 through 23 indicate, both the market
and the legal lists had poor records with respect to rail bonds
at offering, but the market did not assign such an important
place to the rails in its selection of high grades. Again, it seems—
364 PERFORMANCE OF RATiNG SYSTEMS
CHART23—LegalStatus inNew Yorkand MarketRating Com-
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From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research for years
when bond issues in the given industry groups were included on the New York
legallist: par-amount data for alllarge (straight) corporate issues rated by the
market as well as by the New York regulatory authorities, and for 10 percent of
such small issues adlusted annually to universe totals. No defaults occurred on
industrial issues offered in the years when such bonds were on the list.
likelythat the record of the market was marred by its instability
over time; but the point has not beenexplicitly tested by con-
structing annual equivalent lists.
Comparative Yields
Comparisons, in this section, of the yield experience of equally
inclusive lists of securities rated high or low grade under the dif-
ferent rating systems cover assumed investment periods from of-
fering to extinguishment and from beginning to end of eight-
year and longer chronological periods. Sinceissues were not rated
by most agencies during the first two decades of the present century,
and since the• legal lists were not published throughout most of
that period (for Maine they did not appear until 1923), the analy-
sis covers periods beginning January 1, 1920. The yield records
are based on equivalent volumes of issuesincluded in the experi-
ence samples and cover only issues rated byboth of two given
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Averagelife-span yields and loss rates on regular offerings of
straight corporate bonds since 1920 are presented in Tables 74
and 75, in the first of which the composite agency-rating grade
at offering, and in the second, the legal status atoffering, is com-
pared with the market rating. Table 74 indicates that the
weighted average realized yield for the large offerings falling in
the first four agency-rating grades was 5.3 percent, and that this
average exceeded by 0.3 percent the weighted averagerealized
yield of an equally inclusive list of offerings rated high grade by366 PERFORMANCE OF RATING SYSTEMS
the market. Analogous results were obtained for the small issues,
with the average realized yield higher by 0.4 percent for issues rated
i—iv at offering. The superior returns obtained on the agency
selections were partly, but not entirely, the result of the higher
yields promised at offering. As would be expected, the weighted
average promised yields on the "best" issues selected by means of
the market rating (i.e. issues with the highest offering prices and
the lowest promised yields) were below those of equally inclusive
lists of the best issues as defined by the agencies, but not suffi-
ciently below to account fully for the differentials in realized
yields. For the large issues, higher capital gains were obtained on
the best bonds as rated by the agencies (0.5 percent) than on the
corresponding group selected by the market (0.3 percent). Capital
losses occurred generally on the smaller issues, but again the dif.
ferential was in favor of issues rated i—iv by the agencies (an aver-
age loss rate of 0.3 percent for the I—IV's versus 0.5 percent for
the market high grades). AU of these results, except that for the
difference between loss rates of small issues, are statistically sig-
nificant.2
2 The statistical significance of the results may be shown by comparing
independent pairs of unweighted averages obtained by removal of all offerings
rated as high grade under both rating systems. For example, of the 2,861
offerings of large issues in our experience sample that were appraised by
both systems, 2,397 were rated high grade by both agencies and the market,
leaving 270 rated high grade by the agencies and low grade by the market,
and 194 rated high grade by the market and low grade by the agencies. The
latter two samples are independent in a statistical sense, with sample means
for the realized yields of 7.5percentand 3.6 percent, respectively, and sample
variances of 14.4 percent and 34.8 percent. Application of the standard large-
sample test for the difference between means of independent samples shows
that the difference was 8.09 times the estimated standard error of the dif-
ference, or far in excess of the critical value of 1.96 at the 5percentsignificance
level customarily employed in statistical comparisons of this type.
Of the 323 offerings in the small issues experience sample appraised by
both systems, 55wererated high grade by the agencies and low grade by the
market, while 59 were rated low grade by the agencies and high grade by the
market. The sample means of the realized yields were 6.8 percent and 4.9
percent, respectively, and the sample variances, 24.8 percent and 27.4 percent.
In this case, the difference between means is smaller than for the large issues
(2.01 times the estimated standard error of the difference) but again may be
considered statistically significant. Moreover, since the result for the sample
of small issues is independent of that of the sample of large, the combined
result is highly significant in the statistical sense. Similar conclusions obtained
from an analysis of the promised yields and loss rates verify the statements
made in the text above. It should be noted that, for samples of the size em-
ployed here, the test for the difference between means is virtually "distribu-
tion-free," i.e. it is valid under most reasonable assumptions as to the char-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3368 PERFORMANCE OF RATING SYSTEMS
Table 74 also shows the experience on equally inclusive lists of
low-grade issues (issues rated v—ix by the agencies) and their
market-rating equivalents. As might be surmised from the way the
averages were constructed, the behavior of low-grade bonds is
complementary to that of high grades. For if an average yield (or
loss rate) of top-grade issues under one rating system exceeds that
of an equally inclusive list under a second rating system, then
the average yield for low grades under the first system must neces-
sarily fall below the average under the second.3 We therefore con-
clude (and Table 74 verifies) that the weighted average promised
and realized yields for issues rated v—ix were lower than those
of the market-selected low grades and that the loss rate was higher,
these relationships holding for both large and small issues. Again,
the results are statistically significant (except for the difference
between loss rates for small issues)
Thesame point is made graphically in Chart 24, which shows
the average yields and loss rates on regular offerings since 1920
in the individual rating classes. Promised and realized yields on
regular offerings were more systematically related to market ratings
than to agency ratings; that is, the two yields rose more rapidly
for successively lower grades of bonds in the case of the market se-
lections. It follows that promised and realized yields averaged lower
for the very high-grade offerings under the market rating than
under the agency rating, and that for the very low-grade offerings
the reverse was true. Average loss rates were negative and about
the same for offerings in each of the first four agency grades and
for those in market-rating classes under 2 percent; but the positive
loss rates for issues rated v—ix at offering were markedly higher
than those for issues having market ratings of 2 percent or over.
Comparable relationships (which, however, are not independ-
ent of those presented for the agency ratings) occurred among
3Sinceissues rated by both systems are the only ones considered, yield aver-
ages for the total list from highest to lowest grade under each system are iden-
tical. Then if the average for a given volume selected at one end of the quality
scale from the differently rated lists is less for market-rated than for agency-
rated issues, the average for the remainder must be greater for the market-
rated than for the agency-rated group.
Actually the market ratings were not carried out to enough places to enable
us to determine exactly equivalent lists, but the discrepancies are so small in
Table 74 that the above relationship holds.
4Thestatistical significance of these results is an immediate consequence
of the complementarity of the relationships among the averages for high-
and low-grade issues and the fact that the differences between the averages
for the high grades are statistically significant (cf. footnotes 2 andCOMPARISONS 369
CHART 24—Agency and Market Ratings Compared with Respect
to Life-span Yields and Loss Rates: Regular Offerings since
Percent
1920
20 40 60 80
Percent of rated regular offerings
Agency ratings: grades (left to right) I,lI,flI,
Market ratings: classes (left to right)under 1/2%,
l/2tol%, Ito 2%, 2% and over
From Tables 39 and 65: large issues since 1920, without adjustment to exclude
the very few offerings for which yield information sufficed yet no agency rating
was given.
theaverage life-span yields and loss rates for legal bonds
their market-rating equivalents (Table 75). For each state,
for each Issue-size class except one, the weighted average
span yield realized on legal bonds exceeded that of an equal
ume of best bonds as rated by the market.5 With the same
5Thesingle exception occurred in the case of small issues legal in New
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one370 PERFORMANCE OF RATiNG SYSTEMS
exception, the weighted average yield promised at offering was
also higher on legal bonds, but not sufficiently so to explain the
superior realized return. Thus, again, capital gains were lower on
the market-rating equivalents than on the legal bonds. The in-
verse pattern of relationships is observed for large issues not legal
at offering: the average promised yields, realized yields, and capi-
tal gains were lower (or capital losses higher) for nonlegals than
for an equal volume of issues with the poorest market ratings.
The higher realized returns obtained on bonds legal or in the
first four agency-rating grades at offering than on their market-
rating equivalents result partly from the higher promised yields
and partly from the market's tendency toward overoptimism in
the 1920's. As Chart 4andTable 17 show, the highest proportions
of offerings that later defaulted occurred in 1927—30 and 1933.
The market was clearly too optimistic in all of those years (ex-
cept possibly 1933) and too pessimistic in many of the others. Of
the 194 offerings of large issues rated high grade by the market
but not by the agencies (see footnote 2) 62 percent, in number,
were floated in 1927—30 and only 38 percent in other years. This
contrasts with the 270 offerings designated high grade by the
agencies but not by the market, of which only 6 percent were
floated in the high-default years. As a result, only 21.1 percent of
the number of offerings designated high grade by the agencies
and low grade by the market, and 13.9 percent of their par
amount, went into default, while the corresponding figures for
the market's choice were 40.2 percent for number of offerings and
42.6 percent for par amount. On new offerings in each of the four-
year periods 1920—23, 1924—27, and 1928—31 the subsequent de-
fault rates were lower for issues selected by the market than for
those chosen by the agencies, but it is from the third of these
periods, when default rates were extremely high for both groups,
that the majority of the market's selections stern. The lower real-
ized returns on the market-selected lists thus provide another
illustration of the weakness of the market rating when applied as
an invariant standard over a long period of years.
Similar analysis of the legal lists indicates that they too were
less subject to waves of overoptimism and overpessimism than the
of issue, the volume of regular offerings in the small issues sample eligible for
savings bank investment in New York at offering, 1920—43, was negligible (only
$8 million out of a possible $577 million). The exceptional behavior of the
small legals in New York is thus of little practical consequence.COMPARiSONS 371
ciBLE 75—Life-span Yields and
Legal or Not Legal in Maine,
York at Offering and for Equal
Low by the Market, 1920—43
Loss Rates for Offerings
Massachusetts, and New



















offerings since 1920 in Statistical Measures,
supplementary tabulations covering issues in the
sample (all of which, by the nature of the sample, had
systems). Yields and loss rates are weighted averages
included offerings as weights. For issues still outstanding
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on January 1, 1944
quarter of that year.372 PERFORMANCE OF RATING SYSTEMS
market; hence the average life-span yields realized on bonds legal
at offering were above those of securities on equally inclusive lists
selected by means of an invariant market rating at offering.
Futher information on the same subject is provided by Tables
76 and 77. The yields and loss rates of these tables are weighted
averages of outstandings from the large issues experience sample,
and compare differently selected groups of high- or low-grade se-
curities held over assumed long chronological periods of invest-
ment. As before, each equivalent pair of lists includes the same
par-amount total of outstanding issues at the beginning of the
stated period. But here the equivalent lists were first constructed
within each major industry grouping to eliminate industry dif-
ferences in the proportion of issues assigned top quality by the
respective rating systems and were then combined to form the all-
industry totals. This means that the industry composition of each
all-industry list selected by market rating is identical with that
of the corresponding list selected by agency rating or legal status.
For high-grade issues, comparison of the realized yields on the
agencies' and the market's selections (Table 76) reveals that the
differences are negligible, both for the combined industries and
for the major industry components. This was to be partly expected
because the proportion of issues rated high grade by the agencies
is usually very large, so that there is much overlapping with the
market's high grades. Sizable and more systematic differences ap-
pear for the low-grade issues. Since the low grades comprise a
smaller proportion of the total par amount of outstandings than
the high grades and there is less overlapping of included issues,
the averages for low grades are more sensitive to differences in
individual yields. Moreover, for reasons explained earlier (foot-
note 3)theyare complementary to the averages for high grades;
that is, when the average yield for issues rated v—Ix falls below
that of its market-rating equivalent, then the average yield for
issues rated i—iv usually exceeds that of its equivalent. (The com-
plementary relationship holds exactly only if yields and market
ratings are carried out to a sufficient number of decimal places.)
Thus, with allowance for rounding, the figures for low grades
serve to magnify differences that may underlie the rest of the table.
For each of the six periods, the weighted average realized yield
for all issues rated v—ix fell below its market-rating equivalent,
and the same was true in thirteen of the fifteen comparisons pos-
sible in the data for the industry components. Since the periodsCOMPARiSONS 373
are overlapping, the comparisons are not independent and it
cannot be proved that the observed pattern is statistically sig-
nificant. Nevertheless, the results are so one-sided as to leave little
doubt that this was actually the case.6
The evidence of Table 77 covering legal status is similar to
that for the agency ratings. Except for the New York list in 1920—
27 and the Massachusetts and New York lists in 1924—39, the dif-
ferences between the realized yields on legal bonds and their cor-
responding market-rating equivalents are quite small and offset
each other. In this case the same is true of the yields of the lower
grades. The industry breakdowns, which are not presented in
the table, show that realized yields were typically higher for legals
in Massachusetts and New York than for their market-rating equiv-
alents, but the differences are small and not statistically significant.
We conclude that for outstanding issues held over selected
chronological periods, differences in realized yields between high
grades selected by agency rating or legal status and high grades
chosen by the market were usually small and of doubtful practical
significance. Nevertheless, systematic differences were observed
in the yields for low agency grades and the market-rating equiva-
lents, the latter frequently having the higher yields. This implies
that small but systematic differences in the opposite direction
would also be observed in the yields of the high grades, if carried
Out to a sufficient number of decimal places. Analogous but
somewhat larger differences among yields were observed for issues
held from offering to extinguishment, caused principally by the
instability of the market rating over time, but influenced to some
extent by the lower promised returns of the market-rating lists.
Tables 76 and 77 reveal several additional points of interest.
Since a list arrayed in order of market rating is roughly arrayed
in order of promised yield, a given volume of issues selected from
the best market rating downward will usually have an average
promised yield lower than the average for an equal volume of
high grades selected by a different system from the same collec-
tivity of issues. Because the legal lists were more restrictive than
a list comprised of issues in the first four agency-rating grades,
6Certainpairs of periods are nonoverlapping, for example, 1920—27 and
1928—39, and also 1920—31 and 1932—39. For each pair of nonoverlapping pe-
riods, the realized yield for issues rated v—ix was exceeded by the market-rating
equivalent in four out of five possible independent industry-size comparisons.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































such differences are most pronounced for legal bonds. Among
realized yields, on the other hand, the differences were small. As a
result, the loss rates on the market-rating equivalents of the legal
lists were systematically below those for legal bonds (or their
capital gain rates were higher). Comparison of the corresponding
pairs of rates indicates that this occurred in all three of the pe-
riods covered for Maine legals, in all six of the periods for Massa-
chusetts legals, and in five of the six periods for New York legals.
(The single exception was New York, 1920—27, when the capital
gain rate for the legal list slightly exceeded the market-rating
equivalent.) The likely explanation appears to be the higher in-
trinsic quality and lower default rates of outstandings selected
by means of the market rating. Although promised yields were
lower, loss rates were lower too, so that realized yields were about
the same. The implication would seem to be that investors seek-
ing to avoid defaults and those unable to set up adequate loss
reserves would have improved their position by selecting issues on
the basis of the market rating rather than from the legal lists.
No such systematic pattern of behavior is found when outstand-
ing issues in the first four agency-rating grades are compared with
their market-rating equivalents. Since these lists included such a
large proportion of all outstanding issues, the differences among
the average promised yields were negligible, and the same is true
of the realized yields. Thus the average loss rates for equally in-
clusive groups of top-grade outstandings selected by agency rating
and by market rating proved to be roughly similar.
LEGAL LISTS VERSUS AGENCY RATINGS
To complete the round of comparisons of issues included in the
three rating systems, Tables 78 through 80 bring together default
rates and yields for the legal lists and for equally inclusive lists
selected on the basis of agency ratings. The agency-rating equiva-
lents in each case were constructed analogously to the market-
rating equivalents of earlier tables of the chapter. For example, in
constructing Table 78 we found that at the beginning of 1924,
$1.5 billion par amount of public utility bonds or 24.9 percent of
the total of rated utility outstandings that were not in default
were eligible for savings bank investment in Maine. This was
equivalent in volume to a list comprised of all outstanding public
utility issues having composite rating grade i plus 51.0 percent of













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in setting up the agency-rating equivalents, we fell back upon the
market rating. Thus all utility issues having composite grade Ii
were ranked in ascending order by market rating, and the best
51.0 percent (those with narrowest yield spreads) were combined
with issues rated i to obtain the agency-rating equivalent. During
the subsequent four-year period, 1.5 percent of the par-amount
total of legal utility bonds went into default, as against none of
those on the agency list. For that period, therefore, the agency
ratings (supplemented within grade by the market ratings) were
more sensitive to impending utility defaults than the Maine legal
list.
Comparative Safety
Table 78 shows that the records of both the legal lists and the
agencies were excellent with respect to sensitivity to impending
default over short periods, so that non-zero default rates occurred
in only ten cases within the industry groups. For eight of these,
the quadrennial default rate was lower for the agency list than
for the legals, which might be expected from the fact that the
ratings can be revised upward or downward more quickly than
the legal lists. On the other hand, the ten comparisons are not
independent, since each legal list includes issues common to the
others. In other words, the results for the quadrennial periods
suggest a tendency toward superiority for the agency ratings, al-
though it has not been possible to check this by a standard statis-
tical test.
Similar comparisons with respect to life-span default rates are
made in Charts 25 through 27, with results that support and am-
plify the quadrennial data. For each state, the life-span default
rate for legal bonds of the combined industries is above that of
the more inclusive group of issues rated i and ii by the agencies,
showing that agency rating equivalents necessarily had lower de-
fault rates than the legal lists. And by the same token, since the
volume of legal offerings was less inclusive than that of issues rated
i or ii by the agencies, it would have been possible over the period
studied to select a larger volume of given quality (i.e. of offerings
with a given default rate) by means of the agency ratings. Legal
public utilities had excellent default records, but so, too, did the
top two agency grades, which included a larger proportion of the
total volume of utility offerings. For rails the results are similar to
those observed in these charts for all industries. Legal rails had a380 PERFORMANCE OF RATING SYSTEMS
CHART25—Legal Statusin Maine andAgency Rating Compared
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Agency ratings: grades (left to (ight)IIa,
Legal stOtus in Maine: legal (left), not legal (right)
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research for years
when bond issues in the given industry groups were included on the Maine legal
list: par-amount data for all large (straight) corporate issues rated by at least one
investment agency as well as by the Maine regulatory authorities, and for 10 percent
of such small issues adjusted annually to universe totals.























very poor record, with default rates not much better than those of
the nonlegals. Uniformly, rail offerings in the top two agency
rating grades had lower default rates than the legals and com-
prised a larger proportion of total rail offerings. We conclude
that agency ratings were more efficient predictors of default risk
than the legal lists over the entire life span from offering to ex-
tinguishment, and were probably slightly more efficient in pre-
dicting default rates on outstandings held over shorter chrono-
logical periods.
Public utilities
. ... ... ..... ... . . :
Ii I
20 40 60 80
Percent of total rated offerings
Agency ratings: grades (left to right) I, U, 111,
Legal status in Maine: legal (left),not legal (right)382 PERFORMANCE OF RATING SYSTEMS
CHART26—LegalStatusin Massachusetts and Agency Rating
Compared with Respect to Life-span Default Rates
Percent of total rated offerings
Agency ratings: grades (left to right) I, U,
Legal status in Massachusetts: legal (left), not legal (right)
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research for years
when bond issues in the given industry groups were included on the Massachusetts
legallist: par-amount data for all large (straight) corporate issues rated by at
least one investment agency as well as by the Massachusetts regulatory authorities,
and for 10 percent of such small issues adlusted annually to universe totals.
ComparativeYields
Tables 79 and 80, which compare yields and loss rates on legal
bonds and on their agency-rating equivalents, can best be dis-
cussed together. Table 79 covers experience over the full span
from offering to extinguishment, and Table 80, experience over
eight-year and longer chronological periods. The former is affected
by the falling trend of interest rates over the period 1920—43 and
by the fact that approximately 60 percent of the par amount of
offerings legal in each of the three states appeared in the last nine
years of that period, while offerings in the equivalent agency rat-
ing groups were spread more uniformly over the years. The effect
of this unevenness is that in four of the six comparisons in Table
79, legal bonds had lower promised yields at offering than equally
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CHART27—Legal Status in New York and Agency Rating Corn-..















Percent of total rated offerings
Agency grades (left to right) I,K,Iff,
•"...••. Legal status in New legal(left) ,not legal (right)
From special tabulationsofthe National Bureau of Economic Research for years
when bond issues in the given industry groups were included on the New York legal
list: par-amount data for all large (straight) corporate issues rated by at least one
investment agency as well as by the New York regulatory authorities, and for 10
percent of suchsmallissues adjusted annually to universe totals. No defaults
occurred on industrial issues offered in the years when such bonds were on the list.
Note: In public utilities the default rate was zero for agency rating grade II.
setts.The average promised yield was found to be 3.7 percent
for the agency-rating equivalent selected on this basis, as against
4.0 percent for the Massachusetts legals, a result that agrees with
Table 80 rather than Table 79•T
7Actually,special tabulations show that among outstanding issues within
the same agency-rating grade, legals generally sold to yield somewhat less
than nonlegals, as would be expected from the fact that the legal lists channel
investment funds into a narrowly restricted field. The explanation for the
results in Table 80 and in the test run for Massachusetts offerings is that the
average quality of legal bonds judged by agency-rating grade is necessarily
lower than (or equal to) that of an equally inclusive list of the best bonds
on the agency list itself, and that some of the lower-rated bonds have higher
promised yields. Our supplementary use of the market rating in selecting the
agency high grades did not appreciably affect the results. The point was testedPercent of total rated offerings
Agency grades (left to
Legal status in New York: legal (left),not legal (right)
bysacrificing the equality of the volumes compared, and in this way obviat-
ing the need for a supplementary rating. That is, where the volume of agency
high grades equal to the corresponding volume of legals in Table 80 included
buta partof agency grade ri (for example), the agency-rating equivalent was
recomputed with all grade iibondsincluded. Average promised yields never-
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We conclude, therefore, that not too much significance should
be attached to the yield comparisons of Table 79 obtained from
offerings data, although they do suggest that the differences be-
tween the average realized yields of legals and their agency-rating
equivalents were small, with neither type of list having a marked
TABLE 79—Life-span Yields and Loss Rates for Offerings Legal
or Not Legal in Maine, Massachusetts, and New York











Yield Yield Rate Yield Yield Rate
Maine
Legalo 4.0%4.9% —0.9%4.6%5.3% —0.7%
Agency rating
equivalent 4.1 4.8 —0.7 4.6 5.0 —0.4
Not legal 5.2 5.3 —0.1 6,4 5.7 0.7
Agency rating
equivalent 5.1 5.3 —0.2 6.4 5.8 0.6
Massachusetts
Legala 4.0 4.7 —0.7 4.7 5.1 —0.4
Agency rating
equivalent 4.3 5.1 —0.8 4.6 5.0 —0.4
Notlegal 5.1 5.3 —0.2 6.3 5.7 0.6
Agency rating
equivalent 5.0 5,2 —0.2 6.4 5.8 0.6
New York
Legala 4.0 4.5 —0.5 3.5 4.4 —0.9
Agency rating
equivalent 4.1 4.8 —0.7 4.6 4.7 —0.1
Not legal 5.2 5.4 —0.2 6.3 5.7 0.6
Agencyrating
equivalent 5.1 5.3 —0.2 6.3 5.7 0.6
From special tabulations of the National Bureau of Economic Research
covering regular offerings of issues in the offerings experience sample that
were rated by at least one investment agency. Yields and loss rates are weighted
averages with par amounts of included offerings as weights. For issues still
outstanding on January 1, 1944 liquidation is assumed at prices prevailing
in the first quarter of that year.
aRatesmay differ from those given in Table 51 because based only on
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superiority to the other. The same mixed pattern appears in Table
80 for realized yields over eight-year and longer chronological pe-
riods. In seven of the fifteen possible comparisons, the realized
yields were higher for the legals than for the corresponding
agency-selected list, and in the remaining eight comparisons the
reverse was true. On the other hand, since the promised yields on
legal outstandings were uniformly higher (15 excesses in 15 com-
parisons), the loss rates were also usually higher (10 excesses and
4 ties in 15 comparisons). These results are confirmed by the test
run for Massachusetts offerings. The average life-span yield realized
on Massachusetts legals was 4.7 percent, and the yield was simi-
lar (4.6 percent) on the agency-rating equivalent selected on an
annual basis. On the other hand, since the yield promised on
Massachusetts legals at offering was higher, the average capital
gain rate was lower. These results also tend to support Table 80
rather than Table 79.
To summarize, the quadrennial default rates (when not zero)
were lower in most cases for lists selected on the basis of agency
ratings (supplemented by market ratings) than for outstandings
eligible for savings bank investment in the states studied, and the
same is true of the life-span default rates from offering to extin-
guishment. Promised yields on legal outstandings were usually
higher than on the agency-rating equivalents, but since the loss
rates over eight-year and longer chronological periods of invest-
ment were also higher, the realized yields had a mixed pattern.
Many of the differences observed throughout this section are small,
and are of doubtful practical significance.